| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 14:00 - 14:03 | Welcome: Presenter: Joseph Manzano (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) |
| 14:03 - 14:22 | Technical Paper: A Threat Model for Sensitive-Data Workloads on Multi-Tenant AI Supercomputers Sadaf R. Alam, Martin O'Reilly, Matt Craddock, Jim Madge, Matt Penn, George Svarovsky, Jake Watson, Babatunde Oyewo |
| 14:22 - 14:41 | Technical Paper: Privacy Foundations for Multi-Institutional Scientific Artificial Intelligence Olivera Kotevskai, Sumit Jha, Aurélien Bellet, Rui Hu, Nathaniel Bastian, Rafael Ferreira da Silva, Ravi Madduri, Kibaek Kim |
| 14:41 - 15:00 | Technical Paper: A First Look at Conventional Attacks on Scientific Applications Michael Polinski, Peter Dinda |
| 15:00 - 15:30 | Break |
| 15:30 - 16:03 | Distinguished Speaker: TBD TBA |
| 16:03 - 16:22 | Technical Paper: TMD - A Label-Free, Misalignment-Robust Distance for HPC Attack Detection Venkat Sai Suman Lamba Karanam, Zahmeeth Sakkaff, Shubham Sundriyal |
| 16:22 - 16:41 | Technical Paper: Quantifying Workload Exposure in HPC Power Telemetry at Operational Sampling Rates Kwesi Danso, Samuel Abiola, Susan Mengel |
| 16:41 - 17:00 | Technical Paper: Towards Distributed-Memory All-Pairs Reachability over Homomorphically Encrypted Graphs Charis Hului, Anrin Chakraborti, Sidharth Kumar |
| 17:00 - 17:30 | Panel Moderator: Yang Guo (NIST) TBA Panelists: TBD |
| 17:30 - 17:31 | Closing Remarks Joseph Manzano, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory |
Modern computing systems face significant security challenges. While vulnerabilities in CPUs have been extensively studied, GPUs--an increasingly important component of today's computing platforms--have received much less attention. In this talk, I will present our recent studies that aim to bridge this gap. In the first part, I will discuss our findings on GPU memory management systems and demonstrate how weaknesses in their design can be exploited to compromise GPU applications and, in some cases, even CPU applications. In the second part, I will introduce hardware side channels on modern GPUs and show that, despite the adoption of hardware isolation mechanisms, powerful side-channel attacks can still be launched, which pose serious privacy risks to applications such as video games. Finally, I will conclude the talk with a brief discussion of potential countermeasures and directions for future research in GPU security.
Yanan Guo is an Assistant Professor in the CS Department at the University of Rochester. Her research interests lie in computer architecture and cybersecurity, with a goal of building secure, high-performance computing systems. Her work focuses on microarchitectural side channels, memory exploitation, and machine learning security, and she has uncovered multiple vulnerabilities in CPU and GPU system and hardware designs. Her studies have been published in top security and systems venues such as CCS, S and P, USENIX Security, and ASPLOS. Her study on prefetch-based side channels was nominated for Top Picks in Hardware and Embedded Security in 2023, and she received the Best Ph.D. Dissertation Award from IEEE HOST in 2025.
Designed with Mobirise web theme